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Abstract
Grey-box fuzz testing has revealed thousands of vulner-
abilities in real-world software owing to its lightweight
instrumentation, fast coverage feedback, and dynamic adjust-
ing strategies. However, directly applying grey-box fuzzing
to input-dependent multithreaded programs can be extremely
inefficient. In practice, multithreading-relevant bugs are usu-
ally buried in the sophisticated program flows. Meanwhile,
existing grey-box fuzzing techniques do not stress thread-
interleavings that affect execution states in multithreaded pro-
grams. Therefore, mainstream grey-box fuzzers cannot ade-
quately test problematic segments in multithreaded software,
although they might obtain high code coverage statistics.
To this end, we propose MUZZ, a new grey-box fuzzing
technique that hunts for bugs in multithreaded programs.
MUZZ owns three novel thread-aware instrumentations,
namely coverage-oriented instrumentation, thread-context
instrumentation, and schedule-intervention instrumentation.
During fuzzing, these instrumentations engender runtime feed-
back to accentuate execution states caused by thread inter-
leavings. By leveraging such feedback in the dynamic seed
selection and execution strategies, MUZZ preserves more valu-
able seeds that expose bugs under a multithreading context.
We evaluate MUZZ on twelve real-world multithreaded
programs. Experiments show that MUZZ outperforms
AFL in both multithreading-relevant seed generation and
concurrency-vulnerability detection. Further, by replaying
the target programs against the generated seeds, MUZZ also
reveals more concurrency-bugs (e.g., data-races, thread-leaks)
than AFL. In total, MUZZ detected eight new concurrency-
vulnerabilities and nineteen new concurrency-bugs. At the
time of writing, four reported issues have received CVE IDs.
1 Introduction
Multithreading has been popular in modern software systems
since it substantially utilizes the hardware resources to boost
∗Corresponding Author.
software performance. A typical computing paradigm of mul-
tithreaded programs is to accept a set of inputs, distribute
computing jobs to threads, and orchestrate their progress ac-
cordingly. Compared to sequential programs, however, multi-
threaded programs are more prone to severe software faults.
On the one hand, the non-deterministic thread-interleavings
give rise to concurrency-bugs like data-races, deadlocks,
etc [32]. These bugs may cause the program to end up with ab-
normal results or unexpected hangs. On the other hand, bugs
that appear under specific inputs and interleavings may lead
to concurrency-vulnerabilities [5, 30], resulting in memory
corruptions, information leakage, etc.
There exist a line of works on detecting bugs and vulner-
abilities in multithreaded programs. Static concurrency-bug
predictors [2, 40, 45, 50] aim to approximate the runtime
behaviors of a program without actual concurrent execution.
However, they typically serve as a complementary solution
due to the high percentage of false alarms [19]. Dynamic
detectors detect concurrency-violations by reasoning memory
read/write and synchronization events in a particular execu-
tion trace [5, 12, 21, 41, 42, 49, 58]. Several techniques like
ThreadSanitizer (a.k.a., TSan) [42] and Helgrind [49] have
been widely used in practice. However, these approaches by
themselves do not automatically generate new test inputs to
exercise different paths in multithreaded programs.
Meanwhile, grey-box fuzzing is effective in generating test
inputs to expose vulnerabilities [34, 36]. It is reported that
grey-box fuzzers (GBFs) such as AFL [63] and libFuzzer [31]
have detected more than 16,000 vulnerabilities in hundreds
of real-world software projects [16, 31, 63].
Despite the great success of GBFs in detecting vulner-
abilities, there are few efforts on fuzzing user-space multi-
threaded programs. General-purpose GBFs usually cannot
explore thread-interleaving introduced execution states due
to their unawareness of multithreading. Therefore, they can-
not effectively detect concurrency-vulnerabilities inherently
buried in sophisticated program flows [30]. In a discussion in
2015 [64], the author of AFL, Michal Zalewski, even suggests
that “it’s generally better to have a single thread”. In fact, due
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
15
94
3v
1 
 [c
s.S
E]
  3
1 J
ul 
20
20
to the difficulty and inefficiency, the fuzzing driver programs
in Google’s continuous fuzzing platform OSS-fuzz are all
tested in single-threaded mode [15]. Also, by matching unions
of keyword patterns “race*”, “concurren*” and “thread*” in
the MITRE CVE database [48], we found that only 202 CVE
records are relevant to concurrency-vulnerabilities out of the
70438 assigned CVE IDs ranging from CVE-2014-* to CVE-
2018-*. In particular, we observed that, theoretically, at most
4 CVE records could be detected by grey-box fuzzers that
work on user-space programs.
As a result, there are no practical fuzzing techniques to
test input-dependent user-space multithreaded programs and
detect bugs or vulnerabilities inside them. To this end, we
present a dedicated grey-box fuzzing technique, MUZZ, to
reveal bugs by exercising input-dependent and interleaving-
dependent paths. We categorize the targeted multithreading-
relevant bugs into two major groups:
• concurrency-vulnerabilities (Vm): they correspond to
memory corruption vulnerabilities that occur in a multi-
threading context. These vulnerabilities can be detected
during the fuzzing phase.
• concurrency-bugs (Bm): they correspond to the bugs like
data-races, atomicity-violations, deadlocks, etc. We detect
them by replaying the seeds generated by MUZZ with state-
of-the-art concurrency-bug detectors such as TSan.
Note that Bm may not be revealed during fuzzing since they
do not necessarily result in memory corruption crashes. In the
remaining sections, when referring to multithreading-relevant
bugs, we always mean the combination of concurrency-bugs
and concurrency-vulnerabilities, i.e., Vm∪Bm.
We summarize the contributions of our work as follows:
1) We develop three novel thread-aware instrumentations for
grey-box fuzzing that can distinguish the execution states
caused by thread-interleavings.
2) We optimize seed selection and execution strategies based
on the runtime feedback provided by the instrumentations,
which help generate more effective seeds concerning the mul-
tithreading context.
3) We integrate these analyses into MUZZ for an effective bug
hunting in multithreaded programs. Experiments on 12 real-
world programs show that MUZZ outperforms other fuzzers
like AFL and MOPT in detecting concurrency-vulnerabilities
and revealing concurrency-bugs.
4) MUZZ detected 8 new concurrency-vulnerabilities and 19
new concurrency-bugs, with 4 CVE IDs assigned. Consider-
ing the small portion of concurrency-vulnerabilities recorded
in the CVE database, the results are promising.
2 Background and Motivation
2.1 Grey-box Fuzzing Workflow
Algorithm 1 presents the typical workflow of a grey-box
fuzzer [3, 34, 63]. Given a target program Po and the input
Algorithm 1: Grey-box Fuzzing Workflow
input :program Po, initial seed queue QS
output :final seed queue QS, vulnerable seed files TC
1 P f ← instrument(Po) ; // instrumentation
2 TC← /0;
3 while True do
4 t← select_next_seed(QS) ; // seed selection
5 M← get_mutation_chance(P f , t) ; // seed scheduling
6 for i ∈ 1 . . .M do
7 t ′← mutated_input(t) ; // seed mutation
8 res← run(P f , t’, Nc); // repeated execution
9 if is_crash(res) then // seed triaging
10 TC← TC ∪{t ′} ; // report vulnerable seeds
11 else if cov_new_trace(t’, res) then
12 QS← QS⊕ t ′ ; // preserve “effective” seeds
seeds QS, a GBF first utilizes instrumentation to track the cov-
erage information in Po. Then it enters the fuzzing loop: 1)
Seed selection decides which seed to be selected next; 2) Seed
scheduling decides how many mutations M will be applied
on the selected seed t; 3) Seed mutation applies mutations
on seed t to generate a new seed t ′; 4) During repeated ex-
ecution, for each new seed t ′, the fuzzer executes against it
Nc times to get its execution statistics; 5) Seed triaging eval-
uates t ′ based on the statistics and the coverage feedback
from instrumentation, to determine whether the seed leads
to a vulnerability, or whether it is “effective” and should be
preserved in the seed queue for subsequent fuzzing. Here,
steps 3), 4), 5) are continuously processedM times. Notably,
Nc times of repeated executions are necessary since a GBF
needs to collect statistics such as average execution time for
t ′, which will be used to calculate mutation timesM for seed
scheduling in the next iteration. In essence, the effectiveness
of grey-box fuzzing relies on the feedback collected from
the instrumentation. Specifically, the result of cov_new_trace
(line 11) is determined by the coverage feedback.
2.2 The Challenge in Fuzzing Multithreaded
Programs and Our Solution
Figure 1 is an abstracted multithreaded program that accepts
a certain input file and distributes computing jobs to threads.
Practically it may behave like compressors/decompressors
(e.g., lbzip2, pbzip2), image processors (e.g., ImageMagick,
GraphicsMagick), encoders/decoders (e.g., WebM, libvpx), etc.
After reading the input content buf, it does an initial validity
check inside the function check. It exits immediately if the
buffer does not satisfy certain properties. The multithreading
context starts from function compute (via pthread_create
at lines 24-25). It contains shared variables s_var (passed
from main) and g_var (global variables), as well as the mutex
primitive m to exclusively read/write shared variables (via
pthread_mutex_lock and pthread_mutex_unlock).
2
1 i n t g_va r = −1;
2 vo id modify ( i n t ∗pv ) { ∗pv −= 2 ; } // 9
3
4 vo id check ( c h a r ∗ buf ) {
5 i f ( i s _ i n v a l i d ( buf ) ) { e x i t ( 1 ) ; }
6 e l s e { modify ( ( i n t ∗ ) buf ) ; }
7 }
8
9 c h a r ∗ compute ( vo id ∗ s _ v a r ) {
10 g_var += 1 ; // 1
11 g_var ∗= 2 ; // 2
12 i f ( ( i n t ∗ ) s _ v a r [ 0 ] < 0 ) // 3
13 modify ( ( i n t ∗ ) s _ v a r ) ; // 4
14 p t h r e a d _ m u t e x _ l o c k (&m) ; // 5
15 modify (& g_var ) ; // 6
16 p t h r e a d _ m u t e x _ u n l o c k (&m) ; // 7
17 r e t u r n ( c h a r ∗ ) s _ v a r ; // 8
18 }
19
20 i n t main ( i n t a rgc , c h a r ∗∗ a rgv ) {
21 c h a r ∗ buf = r e a d _ f i l e _ c o n t e n t ( a rgv [ 1 ] ) ;
22 check ( buf ) ;
23 p t h r e a d _ t T1 , T2 ;
24 p t h r e a d _ c r e a t e ( T1 , NULL, compute , buf ) ;
25 p t h r e a d _ c r e a t e ( T2 , NULL, compute , buf + 1 2 8 ) ;
26 . . . . . .
27 }
Figure 1: Code segments abstracted from real-world programs.
The shadow lines denote “suspicious interleaving scope” in-
troduced in §4.1.
With different inputs, the program may execute different
segments. For example, based on the condition of statement
3 , which is purely dependent on the input content (i.e., differ-
ent results of buf provided by seed files), it may or may not
execute 4 . Therefore, different seed files need to be gener-
ated to exercise different paths in multithreading context — in
fact, this is the starting point that we use fuzzing to generate
seed files to test multithreaded programs.
Meanwhile, in the presence of thread-interleavings, g_var
(initialized with -1) may also have different values. Let
us focus on different seeds’ executions at two statements:
1 :“g_var+=1”, and 2 : “g_var*=2”. Suppose there are two
threads: T1, T2; and T1: 1 is executed first. Then there are
at least three interleavings:
i) T1: 1 →T2: 1 →T2: 2 →T1: 2 g_var=4
ii) T1: 1 →T2: 1 →T1: 2 →T2: 2 g_var=4
iii) T1: 1 →T1: 2 →T2: 1 →T2: 2 g_var=2
After the second 2 is executed, the values of g_var may
be different (4 and 2, respectively). Worse still, since neither
1 nor 2 is an atomic operation in the representation of
the actual program binary, many more interleavings can be
observed and g_var will be assigned to other values.
The challenge. To reveal multithreading-relevant bugs, a
GBF needs to generate diverse seeds that execute different
paths in multithreading context (e.g., paths inside compute).
However, existing GBFs even have difficulties in generat-
ing seeds to reach multithreading segments. For example, if
check is complicated enough, most of the seeds may fail the
check and exit before entering compute — this is quite com-
mon due to the low quality of fuzzer-generated seeds [34, 61].
Meanwhile, even if a seed indeed executes multithreading
code, it may still fail to satisfy certain preconditions to reach
the problematic context. For example, suppose modify con-
tains a vulnerability that can only be triggered when g_var is
2. If the fuzzer has occasionally generated a seed that executes
compute and the condition of 3 is true, with no awareness of
thread-interleavings, it will not distinguish different schedules
between i), ii) and iii). As a result, subsequent mutations on
this seed will miss important feedback regarding g_var, mak-
ing it difficult to generate seeds that trigger the vulnerability.
To summarize, the challenge of fuzzing multithreaded
programs is, existing GBFs have difficulties in generating
seeds that execute multithreading context and keep thread-
interleaving execution states.
Our solution. We provide fine-grained thread-aware feed-
back for seed files that execute multithreading context and
distinguish more such execution states. According to §2.1,
the preservation of seeds is based on the feedback; then we
can expect that the fuzzer will preserve more distinct seeds
that execute multithreading code segments in the seed queue.
This means that the multithreading-relevant seeds are implic-
itly prioritized. Since these seeds have already passed the
validity checking, the overall quality of the generated seeds is
higher. The “Matthew Effect” helps keep the quality of seed
generations for subsequent fuzzing. Essentially, this provides
a biased coverage feedback on multithreading code segments
(more explanations on this are available in §5.3.
Now let us investigate what instrumentations can be im-
proved to existing fuzzers for thread-aware feedback.
2.3 Thread-aware Feedback Improvements
2.3.1 Feedback to Track Thread-interleavings and
Thread-context
The state-of-the-art GBFs, such as AFL, instrument the en-
try instruction of each basicblock evenly as the basicblock’s
deputy. We refer to this selection strategy over deputy instruc-
tions as AFL-Ins. AFL-Ins provides coverage feedback during
the dynamic fuzzing phase to explore more paths. During re-
peated execution (line 8 in Algorithm 1), AFL labels a value
to each transition that connects the deputies of two consec-
utively executed basicblocks [63]. By maintaining a set of
transitions for queued seeds, AFL-Ins tracks the “coverage”
of the target program. cov_new_trace (line 11 in Algorithm 1)
checks whether a transition indicates a new path/state.
Figure 2b depicts the transitions upon executing the func-
tions compute and modify in Figure 1. For brevity, we use
source code to illustrate the problem and use statements to
represent instructions in assembly or LLVM IR [28].
AFL-Ins works perfectly on single-threaded programs: the
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check
main
compute
modify
L22
L6 L13
L15
L24
L25
(a)
g_var += 1
if ((int*)(s_var)[0] < 0)
pthread_mutex_lock(&m)
modify(&g_var)
pthread_mutex_unlock(&m)
return (char*)s_var
*pv -= 2
modify((int*)s_var)
g_var *= 2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
(b)
Figure 2: (a) thread-aware callgraph of Figure 1; (b) its edge
transitions across compute and modify. In (b), the arrows
denote the transitions between statements. The pentagons
denote basicblocks’ entry statements; the other statements are
represented by rectangles. Their colors are consistent with
function nodes in (a). Since AFL-Ins only tracks branches’
entry statements, only branching edges ( 3 → 4 and 3 → 5 )
and function call edges ( 4 → 9 and 6 → 9 ) are recorded
— these transitions are marked as solid arrows.
kept transitions can reflect both branching conditions (e.g.,
3 → 4 and 3 → 5 ) and function calls (e.g., 4 → 9 and
6 → 9 ). However, AFL-Ins cannot capture these differences
among schedules i), ii) and iii) (c.f. §2.2). In fact, it can only
observe there is a transition 1 → 1 ; thus it will not prioritize
this path for subsequent mutations, compared to other paths
that do not even execute compute. The root cause of this
defect lies in that AFL only tracks entry statements of basic-
blocks evenly, and does not record thread identities. Therefore,
we can add more deputy instructions within multithreading-
relevant basicblocks to provide more interleaving feedback,
and add thread-context information to distinguish different
threads.
2.3.2 Schedule-intervention Across Executions
During a GBF’s repeated execution procedure (line 8 in Al-
gorithm 1), a seed may exhibit non-deterministic behaviors:
it executes different paths of the target program across exe-
cutions due to randomness. In this scenario, AFL (and other
GBFs) will execute against such a seed more times than a seed
with deterministic behaviors [63]. For the non-deterministic
behaviors caused by scheduling-interleaving in multithreaded
programs, since the execution is continuously repeated Nc
times, the system level environment (e.g., CPU usage, mem-
ory consumption, I/O status) is prone to be similar [23, 26].
This will decrease the diversities of schedules, and conse-
quently reduce the overall effectiveness. For example, during
a repeated execution with Nc = 40, schedules i) and iii) might
occur 10 and 30 times respectively, while schedule ii) do not
occur at all; in this scenario, the execution states correspond-
ing to ii) will not be observed by the fuzzer. Ideally, we would
like the fuzzer to observe as many distinct interleavings as
possible during repeated execution since that marks the po-
tential states a seed can exercise. In the case of statements 1
and 2 , we hope schedules i), ii), iii) can all occur. Therefore,
it is favorable to provide schedule interventions to diversify
the actual schedules.
3 System Overview
Figure 3 depicts the system overview of MUZZ. It contains
four major components: A static thread-aware analysis
guided instrumentations, B dynamic fuzzing, C vulnera-
bility analysis, D concurrency-bug revealing.
During A :instrumentation (§4), for a multithreaded
program Po, MUZZ firstly computes thread-aware inter-
procedural control flow graph (ICFG) and the code seg-
ments that are likely to interleave with others during exe-
cution [11,45], namely suspicious interleaving scope, in §4.1.
Based on these results, it performs three instrumentations
inspired by §2.3.
1) Coverage-oriented instrumentation (§4.2) is one kind of
stratified instrumentation that assigns more deputies to sus-
picious interleaving scope. It is the major instrumentation
to track thread-interleaving induced coverage.
2) Thread-context instrumentation (§4.3) is a type of
lightweight instrumentation that distinguishes different
thread identities by tracking the context of threading func-
tions for thread-forks, locks, unlocks, joins, etc.
3) Schedule-intervention instrumentation (§4.4) is a type of
lightweight instrumentation at the entry of a thread-fork
routine that dynamically adjusts each thread’s priority.
This complementary instrumentation aims to diversify
interleavings by intervening in the thread schedules.
During B :dynamic fuzzing (§5), MUZZ optimizes
seed selection and repeated execution to generate more
multithreading-relevant seeds. For seed selection (§5.1), in ad-
dition to the new coverage information provided by coverage-
oriented instrumentation, MUZZ also prioritizes those seeds
that cover new thread-context based on the feedback provided
by thread-context instrumentation. For repeated execution
(§5.2), owing to the schedule-intervention instrumentation,
MUZZ adjusts the repeating times Nc, to maximize the benefit
of repetitions and track the interleaved execution states.
C :Vulnerability analysis is applied to the crashing seeds
found by dynamic fuzzing, which reveals vulnerabilities
(including Vm). D :concurrency-bug revealing component
reveals Bm with the help of concurrency-bug detectors (e.g.,
TSan [42], Helgrind [49]). These two components will be
explained in the evaluation section (§6).
4 Static Analysis Guided Instrumentation
This component includes the thread-aware static analysis and
the instrumentations based on it.
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Figure 3: Overview of MUZZ. Inputs are the original program and initial seeds (in seed queue); outputs are the seeds with
vulnerabilities or concurrency-bugs. It contains four components. A (left area) does static analysis and applies thread-aware
instrumentations; B (center area) contains the flows that proceed with dynamic fuzzing (seed scheduling and seed mutation [34]
are the same as typical GBF flows, thus are marked dashed); C (right-bottom) denotes the vulnerability analysis applied on
vulnerable seeds; and D (right-top) is the replaying component used to reveal concurrency-bugs from the seed queue.
4.1 Thread-aware Static Analysis
The static analysis aims to provide lightweight thread-aware
information for instrumentation and runtime feedback.
4.1.1 Thread-aware ICFG Generation
We firstly apply an inclusion-based pointer analysis [1] on the
target program. The points-to results are used to resolve the
def-use flow of thread-sharing variables and indirect calls to
reconstruct the ICFG. By taking into account the semantics of
threading APIs (e.g., POSIX standard Pthread, the OpenMP
library), we get an ICFG that is aware of the following multi-
threading information:
1) TFork is the set of program sites that call thread-fork func-
tions. This includes the explicit call to pthread_create, the
std::thread constructor that internally uses pthread_create,
or the “parallel pragma” in OpenMP. The called functions,
denoted as Ff ork, are extracted from the semantics of these
forking sites.
2) TJoin contains call sites for functions that mark the end of
a multithreading context. It includes the call sites of the
pthread APIs such as pthread_join, pthread_exit, etc.
3) TLock is the set of sites that call thread-lock functions
such as pthread_mutex_lock, omp_set_lock, etc.
4) TUnLock is the set of sites that call thread-unlock functions
like pthread_mutex_unlock, omp_unset_lock, etc.
5) TShareVar is the set of variables shared among different
threads. This includes global variables and those variables
that are passed from thread-fork sites (e.g., TFork).
4.1.2 Suspicious Interleaving Scope Extraction
Given a program that may run simultaneously with multi-
ple threads, we hope the instrumentation to collect execution
states to reflect the interleavings. However, instrumentation in-
troduces considerable overhead to the original program, espe-
cially when it is applied intensively throughout the whole pro-
gram. Fortunately, with the static information provided by the
thread-aware ICFG, we know that thread-interleavings may
only happen on some specific program statements; therefore,
the instrumentation can stress these statements. We hereby
use Lm to denote the set of these statements and term it as
suspicious interleaving scope. Lm is determined according to
the following three conditions.
C1 The statements should be executed after one of TFork,
while TJoin is not encountered yet.
C2 The statements can only be executed before the invoca-
tion of TLock and after the invocation of TUnLock.
C3 The statements should read or write at least one of the
shared variables by different threads.
C1 excludes the statements irrelevant to multithreading.
These statements can be prologue code that does the validity
check (e.g., check in Figure 1), or the epilogue that post-
processes the inputs or deals with error handlings. C2 pre-
vents the statements that are protected by certain locks from
being put into Lm. C3 is necessary since the interleavings will
not affect the shared states if the segment involves no shared
variables. This condition is determined by observing whether
the investigated statement contains a variable data dependent
on TShareVar (based on pointer analysis). We provide a sep-
arate preprocessing procedure to exclude cases where there
are only read operations on shared variables.
Note that Lm is used to emphasize multithreading-relevant
paths via instrumentations for state exploration during fuzzing.
Therefore the conditions are different from the constraints
required by static models (e.g., may-happen-in-parallel [11,
45]) or dynamic concurrency-bug detection algorithms (e.g.,
happens-before [12] or lockset [41]).
In Figure 1, according to the call pthread_create at
Lines 24 and 25, Ff ork = {compute}. MUZZ then gets all
the functions that may be called by functions inside Ff ork,
i.e., {modify,compute} and according to C1 the scope Lm
comes from Lines 1, 2, 10−17. Inside these functions, we
check the statements that are outside pthread_mutex_lock
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and pthread_mutex_unlock based on C2: Line 15 should
be excluded from Lm. According to C3, we exclude the
statements that do not access or modify the shared vari-
ables g_var, s_var, which means Lines 14 and 16 should
also be excluded. In the end, the scope is determined as
Lm = {1,2,10,11,12,13,17}. Note that although modify can
be called in a single-threading site inside check (Line 6),
we still conservatively include it in Lm. The reason is that
it might be called within multithreading contexts (Line 13
and Line 15) — modify is protected by mutex m at Line 15
while unprotected at Line 13. It is worth noting that line 15,
although protected by m, may still happen-in-parallel [11, 45]
with lines 10 and 11. However, since lines 10 and 11 have al-
ready been put in Lm, we consider it sufficient to help provide
more feedback to track thread-interleavings, with line 15 ex-
cluded from Lm. Overall, the static analysis is lightweight. For
example, the pointer analysis is flow- and context-insensitive
; extraction of thread-aware results such as Ff ork (in C1) and
TShareVar (in C3) are over-approximated in that the stati-
cally calculated sets may be larger than the actual sets; C2
may aggressively exclude several statements that involve in-
terleavings. The benefit, however, is that it makes our analysis
scalable to large-scale real-world programs.
4.2 Coverage-oriented Instrumentation
With the knowledge of Lm, we can instrument more deputy
instructions (corresponding to statements in source code) in-
side the scope than the others, for exploring new transitions.
However, it is still costly to instrument on each instruction
inside Lm since this may significantly reduce the overall ex-
ecution speed of the target programs. It is also unnecessary
to do so — although theoretically, interleavings may happen
everywhere inside Lm, many interleavings are not important
because they do not change the values of shared variables
in practice. This means that we can skip some instructions
for instrumentation, or equivalently instrument them with a
probability. We still instrument, despite less, on segments
outside Lm for exploration purposes [34]. For example, in
Figure 1, we apply instrumentation on check, just in case the
initial seeds are all rejected by the validity check and no inter-
mediate feedback are available at all, making the executions
extremely difficult to even enter compute. Similarly, we can
also selectively instrument some instructions outside Lm.
4.2.1 Instrumentation Probability Calculation
The goal of calculating instrumentation probabilities is to
strike a balance between execution overhead and feedback
effectiveness by investigating code segments’ complexity of
the target programs. First of all, MUZZ calculates a base
instrumentation probability according to cyclomatic com-
plexity [35], based on the fact that bugs or vulnerabilities
usually come from functions with higher cyclomatic complex-
ity [9, 43]. For each function f , we calculate the complexity
value: Mc( f ) = E( f )−N( f ) + 2 where N( f ) is the num-
ber of nodes (basicblocks) and E( f ) is the number of edges
in the function’s control flow graph. Intuitively, this value
determines the complexity of the function across its basic-
blocks. As 10 is considered to be the preferred upper bound
of Mc [35], we determine the base probability as:
Pe( f ) = min
{E( f )−N( f )+2
10
, 1.0
}
(1)
We use Ps as the probability to selectively instrument on
the entry instruction of a basicblock that is entirely outside
suspicious interleaving scope, i.e., none of the instructions
inside the basicblock belong to Lm. Here, Ps is calculated as:
Ps( f ) = min
{
Pe( f ), Ps0
}
(2)
where 0 < Ps0 < 1. Empirically, MUZZ sets Ps0 = 0.5.
Further, for each basicblock b inside the given function f ,
we calculate the total number of instructions N(b), and the
total number of memory operation instructions Nm(b) (e.g.,
load/store, memcpy, free). Then for the instructions within Lm,
the instrumentation probability is calculated as:
Pm( f ,b) = min
{
Pe( f ) · Nm(b)N(b) , Pm0
}
(3)
where Pm0 is a factor satisfying 0 < Pm0 < 1 and defaults to
0.33. The rationale of Nm(b)N(b) is that vulnerabilities usually re-
sult from memory operation instructions [34], and executions
on more such operations deserve more attention.
4.2.2 Instrumentation Algorithm
The coverage-oriented instrumentation algorithm is described
in Algorithm 2. It traverses functions in the target program
P. For each basicblock b in function f , MUZZ firstly gets the
intersection of the instructions inside both b and Lm. If this in-
tersection Lm(b) is empty, it instruments the entry instruction
of b with a probability of Ps ( f ). Otherwise, 1) for the entry
instruction in b, MUZZ always instruments it (i.e., with prob-
ability 1.0); 2) for the other instructions, if they are inside Lm,
MUZZ instruments them with a probability of Pm( f ,b). We
will refer to our selection strategy over deputy instructions as
M-Ins. As a comparison, AFL-Ins always instruments evenly
at the entry instructions of all the basicblocks.
For the example in Figure 1, since the lines 21-25 and
line 5 are out of Lm, we can expect M-Ins to instrument fewer
entry statements on their corresponding basicblocks. Mean-
while, for the statements inside Lm, M-Ins may instrument
other statements besides the entry statements. For example,
1 is the entry statement thus it must be instrumented; state-
ment 2 may also be instrumented (with a probability) — if
so, transition 1 → 2 can be tracked.
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Algorithm 2: Coverage-oriented Instrumentation
input : target program P, and suspicious interleaving scope Lm
output :program P instrumented with M-Ins deputies
1 for f ∈ P do
2 for b ∈ f do
3 Lm(b) = Lm∩ b;
4 if Lm(b) != /0 then
5 for i ∈ b do
6 if is_entry_instr(i, b) then
7 P← instrument_cov(P, i, 1.0);
8 else if i ∈ Lm then
9 P← instrument_cov(P, i, Pm( f ,b));
10 else
11 for b ∈ f do
12 i = get_entry_instr(b);
13 P← instrument_cov(P, i, Ps( f ));
4.3 Threading-context Instrumentation
We apply threading-context instrumentation to distinguish
thread identities for additional feedback. This complements
coverage-oriented instrumentation since the latter is un-
aware of thread IDs. The context is collected at the call
sites of Fctx = {TLock,TUnLock,TJoin}, each of which has
the form TC = 〈Loc,Nctx〉, where Loc is the labeling value
of deputy instruction executed before this call site , and
Nctx is obtained by getting the value of the key identified
by current thread ID from the “thread ID map” collected
by the instrumented function FS (to be explained in §4.4).
Given an item F in Fctx, we keep a sequence of context
〈TC1(F), . . . ,TCn(F)〉,F ∈ Fctx. At the end of each execu-
tion, we calculate a hash value H(F) for item F . The tu-
ple Sctx =
〈
H(TLock),H(TUnLock),H(TJoin)
〉
is a context-
signature that determines the overall thread-context of a spe-
cific execution. Essentially, this is a sampling on threading-
relevant APIs to track the thread-context of a specific execu-
tion. As we shall see in §5.1, the occurrence of Sctx determines
the results of cov_new_mt_ctx during seed selection.
In Figure 1, each time when pthread_mutex_lock∈
TLock is called, MUZZ collects the deputy instruction prior
to the corresponding call site (e.g., 3 ) and the thread ID
label (e.g., T1) to form the tuple (e.g., 〈 3 ,T 1〉); these tuples
form a sequence for TLock, and a hash value H(TLock) will
be calculated eventually. Similar calculations are applied for
pthread_mutex_unlock and pthread_join.
4.4 Schedule-intervention Instrumentation
When a user-space program does not specify any schedul-
ing policy or priority, the operating system determines the
actual schedule dynamically [23, 26]. Schedule-intervention
instrumentation aims to diversify the thread-interleavings to
Algorithm 3: select_next_seed Strategy
input :seed queue QS, seed t at queue front
output :whether t will be selected in this round
1 if has_new_mt_ctx(QS) or has_new_trace(QS) then
2 if cov_new_mt_ctx(t) then
3 return true;
4 else if cov_new_trace(t) then
5 return select_with_prob(Pynt );
6 else
7 return select_with_prob(Pynn);
8 else
9 return select_with_prob(Pnnn);
collaborate with coverage-oriented and thread-context instru-
mentations. This instrumentation should be general enough
to work for different multithreaded programs and extremely
lightweight to keep runtime overhead minimal.
POSIX compliant systems such as Linux, FreeBSD usually
provide APIs to control the low-level process or thread sched-
ules [23, 26]. In order to intervene in the interleavings during
the execution of the multithreading segments, we resort to
the POSIX API pthread_setschedparam to adjust the thread
priorities with an instrumented function named FS that will
be invoked during fuzzing. This function does two tasks:
a) During repeated execution (§5.2), whenever the thread
calls FS, it updates the scheduling policy to SCHED_RR,
and assigns a ranged random value to its priority. This
value is uniformly distributed random and diversifies the
actual schedules across different threads. With this inter-
vention, we try to approximate the goal in §2.3.2.
b) For each newly mutated seed file, it calls pthread_self
in the entry of Ff ork to collect the thread IDs. It has two
purposes: 1) it informs the fuzzer that the current seed is
multithreading-relevant; 2) based on the invocation order
of FS, each thread can be associated with a unique ID Nctx
starting from 1,2, . . ., which composes “thread ID map”
and calculates thread-context in §4.3.
5 Dynamic Fuzzing
The dynamic fuzzing loop follows the workflow of a typical
GBF described in Algorithm 1. To improve the feedback on
multithreading context, we optimize seed selection (§5.1) and
repeated execution (§5.2) for fuzzing multithreaded programs,
based on the aforementioned instrumentations.
5.1 Seed Selection
Seed selection decides which seeds to be mutated next. In
practice, this problem is reduced to: when traversing seed
queue QS, whether the seed t at the queue front will be selected
for mutation. Algorithm 3 depicts our solution. The intuition
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is that we prioritize those seeds with new (normal) coverage
or covering new thread-context.
In addition to following AFL’s strategy by using
has_new_trace(QS) to check whether there exists a seed, s, in
QS that covers a new transition (i.e., cov_new_trace(s)==true),
MUZZ also uses has_new_mt_ctx(QS) to check whether there
exists a seed in QS with a new thread-context (Sctx). If either is
satisfied, it means there exist some “interesting seeds” in the
queue. Specifically, if the current seed t covers a new thread-
context, the algorithm directly returns true. If it covers a new
trace, it has a probability of Pynt to be selected; otherwise,
the probability is Pynn. On the contrary, if no seeds in QS are
interesting, the algorithm selects t with a probability of Pnnn.
Analogous to AFL’s seed selection strategy [63], MUZZ sets
Pynt = 0.95, Pynn = 0.01, Pnnn = 0.15.
As to the implementation of cov_new_mt_ctx(t), we
track the thread-context of calling a multithreading API
in Fctx = {TJoin,TLock,TUnLock} (c.f. §4.3) and check
whether the context-signature Sctx has been met before
— when Sctx is new, cov_new_mt_ctx(t)=true; otherwise,
cov_new_mt_ctx(t)=false. Note that cov_new_trace(t)==true
does not imply cov_new_mt_ctx(t)==true. The reason is
that (1) we cannot instrument inside the body of thread-
ing API functions (as they are “external functions”) in-
side Fctx, hence cov_new_trace cannot track the transitions;
(2) cov_new_mt_ctx also facilitates the thread IDs that
cov_new_trace is unaware of.
5.2 Repeated Execution
Multithreaded programs introduce non-deterministic behav-
iors when different interleavings are involved. As mentioned
in §2.3.2, for a seed with non-deterministic behaviors, a GBF
typically repeats the execution on the target program against
the seed for more times. With the help of FS (c.f. §4.4), we
are able to tell whether or not the exhibited non-deterministic
behaviors result from thread-interleavings. In fact, since we
focus on multithreading only, based on the thread-fork in-
formation kept by FS, the fuzzer can distinguish the seeds
with non-deterministic behaviors purely by checking whether
the executions exercise multithreading context. Further, if
previous executions on a seed induce more distinct values
of Sctx (the number of these values for a provided seed t is
denoted as Cm (t)), we know that there must exist more thread-
interleavings. To determine the repeating times Nc applied on
t, we rely on Cm(t). In AFL, the repeating times on t is:
Nc(t) = N0 +Nv ·Bv, Bv ∈ {0,1} (4)
where N0 is the initial repeating times, Nv is a constant as the
“bonus” times for non-deterministic runs. Bv=0 if none of the
N0 executions exhibit non-deterministic behaviors; otherwise
Bv=1. We augment this to fit for multithreading setting.
Nc(t) = N0 +min
{
Nv,N0 ·Cm(t)
}
(5)
In both AFL and MUZZ, N0 = 8, Nv = 32. For all the Nc
executions, we track their execution traces and count how
many different states it exhibits. The rationale of adjusting
Nc is that, in real-world programs the possibilities of thread-
interleavings can vary greatly for different seeds. For example,
a seed may exhibit non-deterministic behaviors when execut-
ing compute in Figure 1 (e.g., races in g_var), but it exits
soon after failing an extra check inside compute (typically,
exit code >0). For sure, it will exhibit fewer non-deterministic
behaviors than a seed that is concurrently processed and the
program exits normally (typically, exit code =0).
5.3 Complementary Explanations
Here we provide some explanations to show why MUZZ’s
static and dynamic thread-aware strategies help to improve
the overall fuzzing effectiveness.
1) Mutations on multithreading-relevant seeds
are more valuable for seed mutation/generation.
Multithreading-relevant seeds themselves have already
passed validity checks of the target program. Compared to a
seed that cannot even enter the thread-fork routines, it is usu-
ally much easier to generate a multithreading-relevant seed
mutant from an existing multithreading-relevant seed. This
is because the mutation operations (e.g., bitwise/bytewise
flips, arithmetic adds/subs) in grey-box fuzzers are rather
random and it is rather difficult to turn an invalid seed to be
valid. Therefore, from the mutation’s perspective, we prefer
multithreading-relevant seeds to be mutated.
2) MUZZ can distinguish more multithreading-
relevant states. For example, in Figure 1, it can distinguish
transitions 1 → 1 → 2 → 2 and 1 → 2 → 1 → 2 . Then
when two different seeds exercise the two transitions, MUZZ
is able to preserve both seeds. However, other GBFs such
as AFL cannot observe the difference. Conversely, when
we provide less feedback for seeds that do not involve
multithreading, MUZZ can distinguish less of these states and
put less multithreading-irrelevant seeds in the seed queue.
3) Large portions of multithreading-relevant seeds in
the seed queue benefit subsequent mutations. Suppose at
some time of fuzzing, both MUZZ and AFL preserve 10 seeds
(Nall =10), and MUZZ keeps 8 multithreading-relevant seeds
(Nmt =8) while AFL keeps 6 (Nmt =6). Obviously, the probabil-
ity of picking MUZZ generated multithreading-relevant seeds
(80%) is higher than AFL’s (60%). After this iteration of mu-
tation, more seed mutants in MUZZ are likely multithreading-
relevant. The differences of seed quality (w.r.t. relevance to
multithreading) in the seed queue can be amplified with more
mutation iterations. For example, finally MUZZ may keep 18
multithreading-relevant seeds (Nmt =18), and 10 other seeds,
making Nall =28 and NmtNall =
18
28 = 64.3%; while AFL keeps 12
multithreading-relevant seeds (Nmt =12) and 14 other seeds,
making Nall =26 and NmtNall =
12
26 = 46.2%.
Properties 1), 2) and 3) collaboratively affects the fuzzing
effectiveness in a “closed- loop”. Eventually, both Nmt and
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Nmt
Nall
in MUZZ are likely to be bigger than those in AFL. Ow-
ing to more multithreading-relevant seeds in the queue and
property 1), we can expect that:
a) concurrency-vulnerabilities are more likely to be de-
tected with the new proof-of-crash files mutated from
multithreading-relevant files from the seed queue.
b) concurrency-bugs are more likely to be revealed with the
(seemingly normal) files in the seed queue that violate
certain concurrency conditions.
Providing more feedback for multithreading-relevant seg-
ments essentially provides a biased coverage criterion to spe-
cialize fuzzing on multithreaded programs. Other specializa-
tion techniques, such as the context-sensitive instrumentation
used by Angora [7], or the typestate-guided instrumentation
in UAFL [52], provide similar solutions and achieve inspiring
results. The novelty of MUZZ lies in that we facilitate the
multithreading-specific features as feedback to innovatively
improve the seed generation quality. It is worth noting that
our solution only needs lightweight thread-aware analyses
rather than deep knowledge of multithreading/concurrency;
thus, it can scale to real-world software.
6 Evaluation
We implemented MUZZ upon SVF [46], AFL [63] , and
ClusterFuzz [16]. The thread-aware ICFG construction
leverages SVF’s inter-procedural value-flow analysis. The
instrumentation and dynamic fuzzing strategies lay in-
side AFL’s LLVM module. The vulnerability analysis and
concurrency-bug replaying components rely on ClusterFuzz’s
crash analysis module. We archive our supporting materials at
https://sites.google.com/view/mtfuzz. The archive
includes initial seeds for fuzzing, the detected concurrency-
vulnerabilities and concurrency-bugs, the implementation de-
tails, and other findings during evaluation.
Our evaluation targets the following questions:
RQ1 Can MUZZ generate more effective seeds that execute
multithreading-relevant program states?
RQ2 What is the capability of MUZZ in detecting
concurrency-vulnerabilities (Vm)?
RQ3 What is the effect of using MUZZ generated seeds to
reveal concurrency-bugs (Bm) with bug detectors?
6.1 Evaluation Setup
6.1.1 Settings of the grey-box fuzzers
We use the following fuzzers during evaluation.
1) MUZZ is our full-fledged fuzzer that applies all the thread-
aware strategies in §4 and §5.
2) MAFL is a variant of MUZZ. It differs from MUZZ only
on the coverage-oriented instrumentation — MAFL uses
AFL-Ins while MUZZ uses M-Ins. We compare MAFL
with MUZZ to demonstrate the effectiveness of M-Ins, and
compare MAFL with AFL to stress other strategies.
3) AFL is by far the most widely-used GBF that facili-
tates general-purpose AFL-Ins instrumentation and fuzzing
strategies. It serves as the baseline fuzzer.
4) MOPT [33] is the recently proposed general-purpose
fuzzer that leverages adaptive mutations to increase the
overall fuzzing efficiency. It is claimed to be able to detect
170% more vulnerabilities than AFL in fuzzing (single-
thread) programs.
6.1.2 Statistics of the evaluation dataset
The dataset for evaluation consists of the following projects.
1) Parallel compression/decompression utilities including
pigz, lbzip2, pbzip2, xz and pxz. These tools have been
present in GNU/Linux distributions for many years and
are integrated into the GNU tar utility.
2) ImageMagick and GraphicsMagick are two widely-used
software suites to display, convert, and edit image files.
3) libvpx and libwebp are two WebM projects for VP8/VP9
and WebP codecs. They are used by popular browsers like
Chrome, Firefox, and Opera.
4) x264 and x265 are the two most established video encoders
for H.264/AVC and HEVC/H.265, respectively.
All these projects’ single-thread functionalities have been
intensively tested by mainstream GBFs such as AFL. We try
to use their latest versions at the time of our evaluation; the
only exception is libvpx, which we use version v1.3.0-5589 to
reproduce the ground-truth vulnerabilities and concurrency-
bugs. Among the 12 multithreaded programs, pxz, Graphic-
sMagick, and ImageMagick use OpenMP library, while the
others use native PThread.
Table 1 lists the statistics of the benchmarks. The first two
columns show the benchmark IDs and their host projects. The
next column specifies the command-line options. In particular,
four working threads are specified to enforce the program to
run in multithreading mode.
The rest of the columns are the static statistics. Column
“Binary Size” calculates the sizes of the instrumented bina-
ries. Column Tpp records the preprocessing time of static
analysis (c.f. §4.1). Among the 12 benchmarks, vpxdec takes
the longest time of approximately 30 minutes. Columns Nb,
Ni, and Nii depict the number of basicblocks, the number of
total instructions, and the number of deputy instructions for
M-Ins (c.f. §4.2), respectively. Recall that AFL-Ins instruments
evenly over entry instructions of all basicblocks, hence Nb also
denotes the number of deputy instructions in AFL, MAFL,
and MOPT. The last column, Nii−NbNb , is the ratio of more
instructions MUZZ instrumented versus AFL (or MAFL,
MOPT). This ratio ranges from 6.0% (pbzip2-c or pbzip2-
d) to 288.9% (x265). Fortunately, in practice, this does not
proportionally increase the runtime overhead. Many aspects
can affect this metric, including the characteristics of the tar-
get programs, the precision of the applied static analysis, and
the empirically specified thresholds Ps0 and Pm0.
Fuzzing Configuration The experiments are conducted on
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Table 1: Static statistics of the 12 evaluated benchmarks; meanings of the columns are explained in §6.1.2.
ID Project Command Line Options BinarySize Tpp Nb Ni Nii
Nii−Nb
Nb
lbzip2-c lbzip2-2.5 lbzip2 -k -t -9 -z -f -n4 FILE 377K 7.1s 4010 24085 6208 54.8%
pbzip2-c pbzip2-v1.1.13 pbzip2 -f -k -p4 -S16 -z FILE 312K 0.9s 2030 8345 2151 6.0%
pbzip2-d pbzip2-v1.1.13 pbzip2 -f -k -p4 -S16 -d FILE 312K 0.9s 2030 8345 2151 6.0%
pigz-c pigz-2.4 pigz -p 4 -c -b 32 FILE 117K 5.0s 3614 21022 5418 49.9%
pxz-c pxz-4.999.9beta pxz -c -k -T 4 -q -f -9 FILE 42K 1.2s 3907 30205 7877 101.6%
xz-c XZ-5.3.1alpha xz -9 -k -T 4 -f FILE 182K 8.4s 4892 34716 8948 82.9%
gm-cnvt GraphicsMagick-1.4 gm convert -limit threads 4 FILE out.bmp 7.6M 224.4s 63539 383582 98580 55.1%
im-cnvt ImageMagick-7.0.8-7 convert -limit thread 4 FILE out.bmp 19.4M 434.2s 128359 778631 200108 55.9%
cwebp libwebp-1.0.2 cwebp -mt FILE -o out.webp 1.8M 56.3s 12117 134824 33112 173.3%
vpxdec libvpx-v1.3.0-5589 vpxdec -t 4 -o out.y4m FILE 3.8M 431.6s 31638 368879 93400 195.2%
x264 x264-0.157.2966 x264 –threads=4 -o out.264 FILE 6.4M 1701.0s 38912 410453 103926 167.1%
x265 x265-3.0_Au+3 x265 –input FILE –pools 4 -F 2 -o 9.7M 78.3s 22992 412555 89408 288.9%
four Intel(R) Xeon(R) Platinum 8151 CPU@3.40GHz work-
stations with 28 cores, each of which runs a 64-bit Ubuntu
18.04 LTS; the evaluation upon a specific benchmark is con-
ducted on one machine. To make fair comparisons, MUZZ,
MAFL and AFL are executed in their “fidgety mode” [65],
while MOPT is specified with -L 0 to facilitate its “pace-
maker mode” [33]. The CPU affinity is turned off during
fuzzing to avoid multiple threads being bound to a single
CPU core. During fuzzing, we run each of the aforementioned
fuzzers six times against all the 12 benchmark programs, with
a time budget of 24 hours. Since all the evaluated programs
are set to run with four working threads and the threads are
mapped to different cores, it takes each fuzzer approximately
12×6×24×4 = 6912 CPU hours.
6.2 Seed Generation (RQ1)
Table 2 shows the overall fuzzing results in terms of newly
generated seeds. We collect the total number of generated
seeds (Nall) and the number of seeds that exercise the mul-
tithreading context (Nmt). In AFL’s jargon, Nall corresponds
to the distinct paths that the fuzzer observes [63]. The
multithreading-relevant seeds are collected with a separate
procedure, based on the observations that they at least invoke
one element in TFork. Therefore, Nmt tracks the different mul-
tithreading execution states during fuzzing — a larger value
of this metric suggests the fuzzer can keep more effective
thread-interleaving seeds. We sum up those seed files across
all six fuzzing runs to form Nall and Nmt in Table 2. The
Nmt
Nall
column shows the percentage of Nmt over Nall . NmtNall de-
termines the probability of picking a multithreading-relevant
seed during seed selection, which greatly impacts the overall
quality of the generated seeds. Obviously, the most critical
metrics are Nmt and NmtNall .
MUZZ surpasses MAFL, AFL, and MOPT in both metrics.
First, MUZZ exhibits superiority in generating multithreading-
relevant seeds — in all the benchmarks MUZZ achieves the
highest Nmt . For example, in pbzip2-d, despite that all the
Nmt
Nall
are relatively small, MUZZ generated 297 multithreading-
relevant seeds, which is 178 more than MAFL (119), 229
more than AFL (68), and 235 more than MOPT (62). More-
over, for larger programs such as im-cnvt (binary size 19.4M),
Nmt of MUZZ (12987) is still better than the others (MAFL:
10610, AFL: 7634, MOPT: 8012). Second, the value of NmtNall
in MUZZ is more impressive — MUZZ wins the comparison
over all the benchmarks. For example, in pbzip2-d, MUZZ’s
result of NmtNall is higher — MUZZ: 14.9%, AFL: 7.0% MAFL:
4.1%, and MOPT: 3.8%. For the benchmark where AFL has
already achieved a decent result, e.g., 89.3% for x264, MUZZ
can even improve it to 96.5%. Meanwhile, although MAFL
has the largest Nmt for x265 (10890), the value of its NmtNall
(78.6%) is less than that of MUZZ (82.6%).
It is worth noting that MAFL also outperforms AFL and
MOPT w.r.t. Nmt and NmtNall in all the benchmarks. For ex-
ample, in pxz-c, the number of generated multithreading-
relevant seeds in MAFL is 3401, which is more than AFL
(2470) and MOPT (2634). Correspondingly, the percentage
of multithreading-relevant seeds in MAFL is 60.3%; for
AFL and MOPT, they are 46.1% and 47.2%, respectively.
Considering MAFL, AFL, MOPT apply coverage-oriented
instrumentation (M-Ins), we can conclude that other strate-
gies in MAFL, including thread-context instrumentation,
schedule-intervention instrumentation, and the optimized dy-
namic strategies, also contribute to effective seed generation.
Answer to RQ1: MUZZ has advantages in increasing
the number and percentages of multithreading-relevant
seeds for multithreaded programs. The proposed three
thread-aware instrumentations and dynamic fuzzing
strategies benefit the seed generation.
6.3 Vulnerability Detection (RQ2)
For vulnerability detection, we denote the total number of
proof-of-crash (POC) files generated during fuzzing as Nc.
The vulnerability analysis component (right-bottom area as
C in Figure 3) analyzes the POC files and categorizes them
into different vulnerabilities. This basically follows Cluster-
Fuzz’s practice [16]: if two POC files have the same last N
lines of backtraces and the root cause is the same (e.g., both
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Table 2: Fuzzing results on MUZZ, MAFL, AFL and MOPT, in terms of generated seeds. Nall : total number of new seeds; Nmt :
number of new multithreading-relevant seeds; NmtNall : the percentage of multithreading-relevant seeds among all the generated
seeds. Bold data entries mark the best results among the fuzzers, in terms of Nmt and NmtNall . The numbers in parentheses (for Nall
and NmtNall ) denote the differences between MUZZ and the others; for example, “(+1850)” is the more multithreading-relevant seeds
generated by MUZZ: 5127 than MAFL: 3277.
ID
MUZZ MAFL AFL MOPT
Nall Nmt NmtNall Nall Nmt
Nmt
Nall
Nall Nmt NmtNall Nall Nmt
Nmt
Nall
lbzip2-c 8056 5127 63.6% 6307 3277(+1850) 52.0%(+11.7%) 5743 2464(+2663) 42.9%(+20.7%) 6033 2524(+2603) 41.8%(+21.8%)
pbzip2-c 381 126 33.1% 340 91(+35) 26.8%(+6.3%) 272 69(+57) 25.4%(+7.7%) 279 71(+55) 25.4%(+7.6%)
pbzip2-d 1997 297 14.9% 1706 119(+178) 7.0%(+7.9%) 1650 68(+229) 4.1%(+10.8%) 1623 62(+235) 3.8%(+11.1%)
pigz-c 1406 1295 92.1% 1355 1189(+106) 87.7%(+4.4%) 1298 1098(+197) 84.6%(+7.5%) 1176 982(+313) 83.5%(+8.6%)
pxz-c 7590 5249 69.2% 5637 3401(+1848) 60.3% (+8.8%) 5357 2470(+2779) 46.1% (+23.0%) 5576 2634(+2615) 47.2% (+21.9%)
xz-c 2580 1098 42.6% 2234 767(+331) 34.3%(+8.2%) 1953 581(+517) 29.7%(+12.8%) 1845 566(+532) 30.7%(+11.9%)
gm-cnvt 15333 13774 89.8% 14031 10784(+2990) 76.9%(+13.0%) 12453 8290(+5484) 66.6%(+23.3%) 12873 8956(+4818) 69.6%(20.3%)
im-cnvt 14377 12987 90.3% 12904 10610(+2377) 82.2%(+8.1%) 9935 7634(+5353) 76.8%(+76.8%) 10203 8012(+4975) 78.5%(+11.8%)
cwebp 11383 7554 66.4% 10389 6868(+686) 66.1% (+0.3%) 9754 5874(+1680) 60.2% (+6.1%) 9803 5869(+1685) 59.9%(+6.5%)
vpxdec 28892 25593 88.6% 27735 22507(+3086) 81.2%(+7.4%) 24397 18936(+6657) 77.6%(+11.0%) 27119 20896(+4697) 77.1%(11.5%)
x264 15138 14611 96.5% 14672 13413(+1198) 91.4% (+5.1%) 13211 11801(+2810) 89.3% (+7.2%) 12427 11202(+3409) 90.1%(+6.4%)
x265 12965 10704 82.6% 13858 10890(-186) 78.6% (+4.0%) 12980 9957(+747) 76.7% (+5.9%) 13142 10154 (+550) 77.3%(+5.3%)
exhibit as buffer-overflow), they are treated as one vulnerabil-
ity. Afterwards, we manually triage all the vulnerabilities into
two groups based on their relevance with multithreading: the
concurrency-vulnerabilities Vm, and the other vulnerabilities
that do not occur in multithreading context Vs. The number of
these vulnerabilities are denoted as Nmv and N
s
v , respectively.
We mainly refer to Nmc , N
m
v in Table 3 to evaluate MUZZ’s
concurrency-vulnerability detection capability.
The number of multithreading-relevant POC files, Nmc , is
important since it corresponds to different crashing states
when executing multithreading context [27, 34]. It is appar-
ent that MUZZ has the best results of Nmc in all the bench-
marks that have Vm vulnerabilities (e.g., for im-cnvt, MUZZ:
63, MAFL: 23, AFL: 6, MOPT: 6). Moreover, MAFL also
exhibits better results than AFL and MOPT (e.g., for pbzip2-c,
MUZZ: 6, MAFL: 6, AFL: 0, MOPT: 0). This suggests that
MUZZ’s and MAFL’s emphasis on multithreading-relevant
seed generation indeed helps to exercise more erroneous
multithreading-relevant execution states.
The most important metric is Nmv since our focus is to
detect concurrency-vulnerabilities (Vm). Table 3 shows that
MUZZ has the best results: MUZZ detects 9 concurrency-
vulnerabilities, while MAFL, AFL and MOPT detects 5, 4, 4,
respectively. Detected Vm can be divided into three groups.
1) Vm caused by concurrency-bugs. We term this group
of vulnerabilities as Vcb. The 4 vulnerabilities in im-cnvt all
belong to this group — the misuses of caches shared among
threads cause the data races. The generated seeds may ex-
hibit various symptoms such as buffer-overflow and memcpy-
param-overlap. MUZZ found all the 4 vulnerabilities, while
the others only found 2. We also observed that for the 2 vul-
nerabilities that are detected by all these fuzzers, MAFL’s
detection capability appears more stable since it detects both
in all its six fuzzing runs, while the others can only detect them
at most in five runs (not depicted in the table). 2) Vm triggered
in multithreading only but not induced by concurrency-
bugs. For example, the vulnerability in pbzip2-d stems from a
stack-overflow error when executing a function concurrently.
This crash can never happen when pbzip2-d works in single-
thread mode since it does not even invoke that erroneous func-
tion. In our evaluation, MUZZ detected this vulnerability while
the other fuzzers failed. Another case is the vulnerability in
pbzip2-c, which was detected by MUZZ and MAFL, but not
by AFL or MOPT. 3) Other concurrency-vulnerabilities.
The characteristics of these Vm are that their crashing back-
trace contains multithreading context (i.e., TFork is invoked),
however, the crashing condition might also be occasionally
triggered when only one thread is specified. The Vm vulnera-
bilities detected in vpxdec and x264 belong to this category.
In particular, MUZZ detects 2 vulnerabilities in vpxdec while
MAFL, AFL, and MOPT only find 1.
We consider the reason behind the differences w.r.t. Nmc and
Nmv among the fuzzers to be that, MUZZ keeps more “deeper”
multithreading-relevant seeds that witness different execution
states, and mutations on some of them are more prone to
trigger the crashing conditions.
Columns Nc, Nsc , N
s
v are metrics less focused. But we can
still observe that 1) according to Nc, MUZZ (and MAFL) can
exercise more total crashing states; 2) despite that the values
of Nsc from MUZZ are usually smaller, MUZZ can still find all
the (categorized) Vs detected by other fuzzers.
From the 12 evaluated benchmarks, we reported the 10 new
vulnerabilities (sum of MUZZ’s results in columns Nmv and
Nsv except for row vpxdec; 7 of them belong to Vm), all of
them have been confirmed or fixed, 3 of which have already
been assigned CVE IDs. Besides, we also conducted a similar
evaluation on libvpx v1.8.0-178 (the git HEAD version at
the time of evaluation). MUZZ detected a 0-day concurrency-
vulnerability within 24 hours (among six fuzzing runs, two
of them detected the vulnerability in 5h38min and 16h07min,
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Table 3: Fuzzing results on MUZZ, MAFL, AFL and MOPT, in terms of crashes and vulnerabilities. Some projects (e.g., lbzip2-c)
are excluded since there were no crashes/vulnerabilities detected by any of the fuzzers. Nc: number of proof-of-crash (POC)
files; Nmc : number of multithreading-relevant POC files; N
m
v : number of concurrency-vulnerabilities. N
s
c : number of POC files
irrelevant with multithreading; Nsv : number of vulnerabilities irrelevant to multithreading. Bold data entries mark the best results
for Nmc and N
m
v . The numbers in parentheses denote the differences between MUZZ and others.
ID
MUZZ MAFL AFL MOPT
Nc Nmc N
m
v N
s
c N
s
v Nc N
m
c N
m
v N
s
c N
s
v Nc N
m
c N
m
v N
s
c N
s
v Nc N
m
c N
m
v N
s
c N
s
v
pbzip2-c 6 6 1 0 0 6 0(+6) 1(0) 0 0 0 0(+6) 0(+1) 0 0 0 0(+6) 0(+1) 0 0
pbzip2-d 15 15 1 0 0 0 0(+15) 0(+1) 0 0 0 0(+15) 0(+1) 0 0 0 0(+15) 0(+1) 0 0
im-cnvt 87 63 4 24 1 49 23(+40) 2(+2) 26 1 29 6(+57) 2(+2) 23 1 32 6(+57) 2(+2) 26 1
cwebp 19 0 0 19 1 27 0(0) 0(0) 27 1 14 0(0) 0(0) 14 1 15 0(0) 0(0) 15 1
vpxdec 523 347 2 176 2 495 279(+68) 1(+1) 216 2 393 205(+142) 1(+1) 188 2 501 301(+46) 1(+1) 200 2
x264 103 103 1 0 0 88 88(+15) 1(0) 0 0 78 78(+25) 1(0) 0 0 66 66(+37) 1(0) 0 0
x265 43 0 0 43 1 52 0(0) 0(0) 52 1 62 0(0) 0(0) 62 1 59 0(0) 0(0) 59 1
respectively), while MAFL, AFL and MOPT failed to detect
it in 15 days (360 hours) in all their six fuzzing runs. The
newly detected vulnerability has been assigned with another
CVE ID. The vulnerability details are available in Table 5.
Given the fact that there are extremely few CVE records
caused by concurrency-vulnerabilities (e.g., 202 among
70438, based on records from CVE-2014-* to CVE-2018-
*) [48], MUZZ demonstrates the high capability in detecting
concurrency-vulnerabilities.
Answer to RQ2: MUZZ demonstrates superiority in
exercising more multithreading-relevant crashing states
and detecting concurrency-vulnerabilities.
6.4 Concurrency-bug Revealing (RQ3)
The fuzzing phase only detects the vulnerabilities caused by
crashes, but the seemingly normal seed files generated dur-
ing fuzzing may still execute paths that trigger concurrency-
violation conditions like data-races, deadlocks, etc. We detect
concurrency-bugs in concurrency-bug revealing component (
D , right-top in Figure 3). It is worth noting that our goal is
not to improve the capabilities of concurrency-bug detection
over existing techniques such as TSan [42], Helgrind [49],
or UFO [21]. Instead, we aim to reveal as many bugs as
possible within a time budget, by replaying against fuzzer-
generated seeds with the help of these techniques. In practice,
this component feeds the target program with the seeds that
were generated during fuzzing as its inputs, and facilitate de-
tectors such as TSan to reveal concurrency-bugs. During this
evaluation, we compiled the target programs with TSan and
replayed them against the fuzzer-generated multithreading-
relevant seeds (corresponding to Nmt in Table 2). We did not
replay with all the generated seeds (corresponding to Nall in
Table 2) since seeds not exercising multithreading context
will not reveal concurrency-bugs.
We limit our replay time budget to two hours; in §6.5.4 we
discuss the rationale of this configuration. The next is to deter-
mine the replay pattern per seed to reveal more concurrency-
bugs within this budget. This is necessary since TSan may
fail to detect concurrency-bugs in a few runs when it does
not observe concurrency violation conditions [12, 42, 49].
Meanwhile, as the time budget is limited, we cannot exhaus-
tively replay against a given seed to see whether it may trigger
concurrency-violations — in the worst case, we may waste
time in executing against a seed that never violates the condi-
tions. We provide two replay patterns.
P1 It executes against each seed in the queue once per turn
in a round-robin way, until reaching the time budget.
P2 It relies onNc in repeated execution (c.f., §5.2): each seed
is executed NcN0 times per turn continuously in a round-
robin way. According to Equation 4, we replay 5 times
per turn (40/8) for AFL generated multithreading-relevant
seeds; for MUZZ and MAFL, it is determined by Equa-
tion (5), with candidate values 2, 3, 4, 5.
It is fair to compare replay results w.r.t. P1 and P2 in that
the time budget is fixed. The difference between the two
patterns is that seeds’ execution orders and accumulated exe-
cution time spent on them can be rather different.
Table 4 depicts the results for concurrency-bug revealing
with P1 and P2. Nme is the number of observed concurrency-
violation executions and NmB is the number of concurrency-
bugs (Bm) according to their root causes. For example, it only
counts one concurrency-bug (NmB =1) even when the replay-
ing process observes 10 data-race pairs across executions
(Nme =10), as long as the root cause of the races is unique. We
analyze this table from two perspectives.
First, MUZZ demonstrates superiority in concurrency-bug
detection regardless of replay patterns. This is observed based
on the “best results” for each metric in each pattern. MUZZ
achieves the best results for most projects. For example, when
x264 is replayed with Nme , 1) MUZZ’s found the most viola-
tions — the values of Nme are, MUZZ: 68, MAFL: 46, AFL:
28, MOPT: 30; 2) the best result of NmB also comes from
MUZZ, MUZZ: 8, MAFL: 6, AFL: 4, MOPT: 5. Similar re-
sults can also be observed with P2 for x264, where MUZZ
has the biggest Nme (91) and biggest N
m
B (9). The only project
where MAFL achieves the best is pigz-c, where it is slightly
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Table 4: Comparisons of replay patterns P1 and P2 on MUZZ, MAFL, AFL and MOPT, in terms of concurrency violations (Nme )
and concurrency-bugs (NmB ). The best results of N
m
e and N
m
B are underlined / bold for P1 / P2 respectively.
ID
P1 P2
MUZZ MAFL AFL MOPT MUZZ MAFL AFL MOPT
Nme N
m
B N
m
e N
m
B N
m
e N
m
B N
m
e N
m
B N
m
e N
m
B N
m
e N
m
B N
m
e N
m
B N
m
e N
m
B
lbzip2-c 469 1 447 1 386 1 435 1 493 1 483 1 421 1 458 1
pigz-c 793 1 803 1 764 1 789 1 856 1 862 1 727 1 742 1
gm-cnvt 93 5 79 4 45 2 55 3 133 5 83 4 54 3 57 3
im-cnvt 92 3 84 3 58 2 56 2 118 3 117 3 65 2 59 2
vpxdec 31 3 17 1 23 1 18 1 42 3 22 1 25 1 22 1
x264 68 8 46 6 28 4 30 5 91 9 52 6 25 4 28 4
better than MUZZ.
Second, as to MUZZ and MAFL, P2 is probably better
than P1. It is concluded based on the fact that P2’s “best
results” are all better than P1’s. For example, as to Nme in
x264, the best result of Nme is achieved with P2 (P1: 68, P2:
91); similarly, the best result of NmB also comes from P2 (P1: 8,
P2: 9). In the meantime, there seems to be no such implication
inside AFL or MOPT. Besides the numbers of concurrency-
violations or concurrency-bugs, §6.5.3 provides a case study
on gm-cnvt that demonstrates P2’s advantages over P1 w.r.t.
time-to-exposure of the concurrency-bugs.
We have reported all the newly detected 19 concurrency-
bugs (excluding the 3 concurrency-bugs in vpxdec-v1.3.0-
5589) to their project maintainers (c.f., Table 5 for the details).
Answer to RQ3: MUZZ outperforms competitors in de-
tecting concurrency-bugs; the value Nc calculated during
fuzzing additionally contributes to revealing these bugs.
6.5 Further Discussions
This section discusses miscellaneous concerns, issues and
observations for MUZZ’s design and evaluation.
6.5.1 Constant Parameters
Using empirical constant parameters for grey-box fuzzing is
practiced by many fuzzing techniques [6,33,63]. For example,
AFL itself has many hard-coded configurations used by de-
fault; MOPT additionally has the suggested configuration to
control the time to move on to pacemaker mode (i.e., -L 0).
In MUZZ, constant parameters are used in two places.
(1) The upper bounds for coverage-oriented instruc-
tion: Ps0 (defaults to 0.5) and Pm0 (defaults to 0.33). These
default values inspire from AFL’s “selective deputy instruc-
tion instrumentation” strategy to make the instrumentation
ratio to be 0.33 when AddressSanitizer is involved during
instrumentation . Larger values of Ps0 and Pm0 increases the
instrumentation ratio only if the thresholds are frequently
reached. Subsequently, the instrumented program has these
symptoms: a) the program size after instrumentation in-
creases; b) the execution state feedback is potentially better; c)
the instrumentation-introduced execution speed slowdown is
more evident. Therefore, increasing the values of Ps0 and Pm0
reflects a tradeoff between precise feedback and its overhead.
In our benchmarks, when we assign Ps0 =0.5, Pm0 =0.33,
• For im-cnvt, the speed slowdown is about 15% com-
pared to default settings, while the capability of detecting
concurrency-vulnerabilities and concurrency-bugs are
similar; meanwhile, there are a few more multithreading-
relevant seeds (Nmt ) but NmtNall is slightly smaller.• For pbzip2-c, the differences brought by changes of Ps0
and Pm0 from the default settings are all neglectable.
We believe there are no optimal instrumentation thresholds
that work for all the projects; therefore MUZZ provides the
empirical values as the defaults.
(2) The seed selection probabilities Pynt = 0.95, Pynn =
0.01, Pnnn = 0.15 in Algorithm 3. These constants are not in-
troduced by MUZZ, but based on AFL’s “skipping probability”
to conditionally favor seeds with new coverage [63].
Since the 12 benchmarks that we chose are quite diversified
(c.f., §6.1.2), it is considered fair to use default settings for
these parameters, when comparing MUZZ, MAFL with other
fuzzers such as AFL, MOPT. In practice, we suggest keeping
MUZZ’s default settings to test other multithreaded programs.
6.5.2 Schedule-intervention Instrumentation
The goal of MUZZ’s schedule-intervention is to diversify
interleavings during repeated executions in the fuzzing phase.
During the evaluation, we did not separately evaluate the
effects of schedule-intervention instrumentation. However,
based on our observation, this instrumentation is important
to achieve more stable fuzzing results. Two case studies can
support this statement.
a) We turned off schedule-intervention instrumentation
in MUZZ and fuzzed lbzip2-c six times on the same
machine. The calculated value of NmtNall is 54.5% (=
4533/8310), which is lower than the result in Table 2
(63.6% = 5127/8056). Since 54.5% is still greater than
the results of AFL (42.9%) and MOPT (41.8%), this also
indicates MUZZ’s other two strategies indeed benefit the
multithreading-relevant seed generation for fuzzing.
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Table 5: Newly detected vulnerabilities and concurrency-bugs. This summarizes the new vulnerabilities and concurrency-bugs
evaluated in Table 3 and Table 4 over the 11 benchmarks (libvpx-v1.3.0-5589 results are all excluded), and includes one
concurrency-vulnerability in vpxdec-v1.8.0-178 which was mentioned in §6.3.
Bugs Project Bug Type Reported Category MUZZ MAFL AFL MOPT Status
V1 pbzip2 Vm divide-by-zero 3 3 7 7 confirmed, not fixed
V2 pbzip2 Vm stack-overflow 3 7 7 7 confirmed, not fixed
V3 ImageMagick Vm memcpy-param-overlap 3 7 7 7 CVE-2018-14560
V4 ImageMagick Vm buffer-overflow 3 3 3 3 CVE-2019-15141
V5 ImageMagick Vm buffer-overflow 3 3 3 3 confirmed, fixed
V6 ImageMagick Vm buffer-overflow 3 7 7 7 confirmed, fixed
V7 ImageMagick Vs negative-size-param 3 3 3 3 CVE-2018-14561
V8 x264 Vm buffer-overflow 3 3 3 3 confirmed, fixed
V9 libwebp Vs failed-to-allocate 3 3 3 3 confirmed, won’t fix
V10 x265 Vs divide-by-zero 3 3 3 3 confirmed, not fixed
V11 libvpx-v1.8.0-178 Vm invalid-memory-read 3 7 7 7 CVE-2019-11475
C1 lbzip2 Bm thread-leak 3 3 3 3 confirmed, not fixed
C2 pigz Bm lock-order-inversion 3 3 3 3 confirmed, fixed
C3-C7 GraphicsMagick Bm data-race 5 4 3 2 confirmed, fixed
C8-C10 ImageMagick Bm data-race 3 3 2 2 confirmed, fixed
C11-C19 x264 Bm data-race 9 6 4 4 confirmed, not fixed
b) We turned off schedule-intervention instrumentation in
MUZZ and fuzzed im-cnvt on a different machine. In all
the six fuzzing runs it only detects three concurrency-
vulnerabilities which is less than the result in Table 3
(Nmv =4). Meanwhile, when the schedule-intervention
instrumentation is re-enabled, MUZZ can still detect four
concurrency-vulnerabilities in that machine.
6.5.3 Time-to-exposure for Concurrency-bug Revealing
In §6.4, we demonstrate P2’s advantage over P1 in terms of
occurrences of concurrency-violations (Nme ) and the number
of categorized concurrency-bugs (NmB ). Another interesting
metric is the time-to-exposure capability of these two replay
patterns — given the ground truth that the target programs
contain certain concurrency-bugs, the minimal time cost for
each pattern to reveal all the known bugs. This metric can
further distinguish the two replay patterns’ capabilities in
terms of revealing concurrency-bug.
We conducted a case study on gm-cnvt. From Table 4, it
is observable that with both P1 and P2, TSan detected four
concurrency-bugs (NmB ) by replaying the MAFL generated
multithreading-relevant seeds (totally 10784) from Table 2;
besides, their Nme results are also similar (P1: 79, P2: 83). We
repeated six times against the 10784 seeds by applying P1 and
P2. When a replaying process detects all the four different
ground-truth concurrency-bugs, we record the total execution
time (in minutes). Table 6 shows the results.
In Table 6, compared to P1, we can observe that P2 re-
duces the average time-to-exposure from 66.5 minutes to 34.1
minutes. This fact means, for example, given a tighter replay
time budget (say, 60 minutes), P1 has a high chance to miss
some of the four concurrency-bugs. Moreover, P2 is more
stable since the timing variance is much smaller than that of
Table 6: Time-to-exposure of gm-cnvt’s concurrency-bugs
during six replays with patterns P1 and P2.
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 Avg Variance
P1 55.3 92.1 21.8 93.7 101.5 34.7 66.5 959.2
P2 33.4 52.2 33.5 37.6 24.7 23.3 34.1 91.0
P1 (91.0 vs. 959.2). This result implicates that, in Table 4, for
the concurrency-bug revealing capability of MAFL, the P2’s
result in gm-cnvt is likely to be much better than P1’s.
The evaluation of time-to-exposure suggests that, given a
set of seeds, P2 is prone to expose concurrency-bugs faster
and more stable. Since P2 is closely relevant to schedule-
intervention instrumentation (§4.4) and repeated execution
(§5.2), this also indicates that these strategies are helpful for
concurrency-bug revealing.
6.5.4 Time Budget During Replaying
We chose two hours (2h) as the time budget in the reply phase
during evaluation. Unlike the fuzzing phase, which aims to
generate new seed files that exercise multithreading context,
the replay phase runs the target program against existing seeds
(generated during fuzzing). Therefore, the criterion is to 1)
minimize the time for replay; 2) ensure that replay phase tra-
verses all the generated seeds. For projects with less generated
(multithreading-relevant) seeds (e.g., Nmt =126 for pbzip2-c
when applying MUZZ), traversing the seeds (with both P1
and P2) once are quite fast; however for projects with more
generated seeds (e.g., Nmt =13774 for gm-cnvt when applying
MUZZ), this requires more time. To make the evaluation fair,
we use the fixed time budget for all the 12 benchmarks, where
seeds in projects like pbzip2-c will be traversed repeatedly un-
til timeout. During the evaluation, we found 2h to be moderate
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since it can traverse all the generated multithreading-relevant
seeds at least once for all the projects.
Less time budget, e.g., 1h, may make the replay phase to
miss certain generated seeds triggering concurrency violation
conditions. In fact, from Table 6, we see that time-to-exposure
for the concurrency-bugs may take 101.5 minutes. Meanwhile,
more time budget, e.g., 4h, might be a waste of time for the
exercised 12 benchmarks. In fact, in a case study for gm-cnvt,
when time budget is 4h, despite that Nme is nearly doubled,
the number of revealed Bm (i.e., NmB ) is still the same as the
results in Table 4, regardless of P1 or P2.
6.5.5 Statistical Evaluation Results
Specific to the nature of multithreaded programs and our
evaluation strategy to determine seeds’ relevance with mul-
tithreading, we decide not to provide some commonly-used
statistical results [27].
First, it is unfair to track coverage over time when com-
paring MUZZ, MAFL with AFL or MOPT due to the dif-
ferent meanings of “coverage”. In fact, owing to coverage-
oriented instrumentation (in MUZZ) and threading-context
instrumentation (in MUZZ and MAFL), MUZZ and MAFL
cover more execution states (corresponding to Nall), therefore
naturally preserve more seeds. That is also the reason that in
§6.2 the values of Nmt and NmtNall are more important than Nall .
Second, we cannot compare the multithreading-relevant
paths over time among MUZZ, MAFL, AFL, and MOPT.
This reason is simple: we resort to a separate procedure after
fuzzing to determine whether it covers thread-forking rou-
tines. We have to do so since AFL and MOPT do not pro-
vide a builtin solution to discovering seeds’ relevance with
multithreading. Consequently, we cannot plot multithreading-
relevant crashing states over time.
Third, despite that the statistical variance is important, it
is not easy to be calculated comprehensively. During eval-
uation, to reduce the variance among individuals, we apply
an ensemble strategy by sharing seeds among the six runs,
for each of the specific fuzzers [63]. However, for multi-
threaded target programs, another variance comes from the
thread scheduling for different threads (in our experiments,
four working threads were specified). MUZZ and MAFL have
the schedule-intervention instrumentation to help diversify
the effects, while it is absent in AFL and MOPT. In fact, from
the case studies in §6.5.2, we envision that the variance may
be huge for different machines under different workloads. Due
to this, providing fair statistical results w.r.t. the variance may
still be impractical. Therefore, we tend to exclude variance
metrics and only choose those that exhibit the “overall re-
sults”, i.e., Nmt , NmtNall , N
m
c , N
m
v , N
m
e , and N
m
B . Similarly, the case
studies or comparisons in §6.2, §6.3, §6.4 are all based on
“overall results”. During the evaluation, we indeed observed
that the results of MUZZ and MAFL are more stable than
those of AFL and MOPT.
7 Related Work
7.1 Grey-box Fuzzing Techniques
The most relevant is the fuzzing techniques on concurrency-
vulnerability detection. ConAFL [30] is a thread-aware GBF
that focuses on user-space multithreaded programs. Much dif-
ferent from MUZZ’s goal to reveal both Vm and Bm, ConAFL
only detects a subset of concurrency-bug induced vulnera-
bilities (Vcb) that cause buffer-overflow, double-free, or use-
after-free. ConAFL also utilizes heavy thread-aware static
and dynamic analyses, making it suffer from scalability is-
sues. The other difference is that MUZZ’s thread-aware anal-
yses aim to provide runtime feedback to distinguish more
execution states in multithreading contexts, to bring more
multithreading-relevant seeds; meanwhile, ConAFL relies on
the discovery of sensitive concurrency operations to capture
pairs that may introduce the aforementioned three kinds of
vulnerabilities. Further, since the static and dynamic analyses
aim to capture and intervene “sensitive concurrency operation
pairs”, ConAFL suffers from the scalability issue. In fact,
the biggest binary it evaluated was 196K (bzip2smp), while
MUZZ can handle programs scaling to 19.4M (im-cnvt). In the
evaluation, we did not evaluate ConAFL — the GitHub ver-
sion of ConAFL (https://github.com/Lawliar/ConAFL)
does not work since its static analysis is not publicly available
and it is not trivial to implement that technique ourselves; fur-
ther, we have not obtained the runnable tool after we requested
from the authors. RAZZER [24] utilizes a customized hyper-
visor to control thread-interleaving deterministically to trigger
data races in Linux kernel. It is a kernel fuzzer that cannot re-
veal multithreading-relevant bugs in user-space programs. As
a matter of fact, the proof-of-crashes are essentially sequences
of system calls that could trigger race conditions, and the fix
of the detected vulnerabilities requires patches to the kernel
code. Consequently, the guidance of fuzzing is also different.
RAZZER spots the over-approximated racing segments and
tames non-deterministic behavior of the kernel such that it can
deterministically trigger a race. While MUZZ’s solution is to
distinguish more thread-interleaving states to trap the fuzzing
to reveal more multithreading-relevant paths. Practically, it is
not easy to effectively sequentialize the thread-interleavings
to fuzz the user-space programs [64].
Multithreading-relevant bugs are inherently deep. To re-
veal deep bugs in the target programs, some GBFs facilitate
other feedback [7,14,29,44,52,55,56,61]. Angora [7] distin-
guishes different calling context when calculating deputy in-
struction transitions to keep more valuable seeds. Driller [44],
QSYM [61], and Savior [8] integrate symbolic execution to
provide additional coverage information to exercise deeper
paths. MUZZ inspires from these techniques in that it pro-
vides more feedback for multithreading context with strati-
fied coverage-oriented and thread-context instrumentations, as
well as schedule-intervention instrumentation. Other fuzzing
techniques utilize the domain knowledge of the target pro-
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gram to generate more effective seeds [39,53,54]. Skyfire [53]
and Superion [54] provide customized seed generation and
mutation strategies on the programs that feed grammar-based
inputs. SGF [39] relies on the specifications of the structured
input to improve seed quality. These techniques are orthog-
onal to MUZZ and can be integrated into seed mutation (c.f.
B in Figure 3).
7.2 Static Concurrency-bug Prediction
Static concurrency-bug (Bm) predictors aim to approximate
the runtime behaviors of a concurrent program without actual
execution. Several static approaches have been proposed for
analyzing Pthread and Java programs [40, 45, 50]. LOCK-
SMITH [40] uses existential types to correlate locks and data
in dynamic heap structures for race detection. Goblint [50]
relies on a thread-modular constant propagation and points-to
analysis for detecting concurrent bugs by considering condi-
tional locking schemes. [51] scales its detection to large code-
bases by sacrificing soundness and suppressing false alarms
using heuristic filters. FSAM [45, 46] proposes a sparse flow-
sensitive pointer analysis for C/C++ programs using context-
sensitive thread-interleaving analysis. Currently, MUZZ re-
lies on flow- and context-insensitive results of FSAM for
thread-aware instrumentations. We are seeking solutions to
integrating other bug prediction techniques to further improve
MUZZ’s effectiveness.
7.3 Dynamic Analysis on Concurrency-bugs
There are a large number of dynamic analyses on concurrency-
bugs. They can be divided into two categories: modeling
concurrency-bugs and strategies to trigger these bugs.
The techniques in the first category [12,41,42,59] typically
monitor the memory and synchronization events [19]. The
two fundamentals are happens-before model [12] and lockset
model [41]. Happens-before model reports a race condition
when two threads read/write a shared memory arena in a
causally unordered way, while at least one of the threads write
this arena. Lockset model conservatively considers a potential
race if two threads read/write a shared memory arena without
locking. Modern detectors such as TSan [42], Helgrind [49]
usually apply a hybrid strategy to combine these two mod-
els. MUZZ does not aim to improve existing concurrency
violation models; instead, it relies on these models to detect
concurrency-bugs with our fuzzer-generated seeds.
The second category of dynamic analyses focuses on how
to trigger concurrency violation conditions. This includes
random testings that mimic non-deterministic program execu-
tions [4, 25, 38], regression testings [47, 60] that target inter-
leavings from code changes, model checking [13, 57, 62] and
hybrid constraint solving [20–22] approaches that systemati-
cally check or execute possible thread schedules, heuristically
avoid fruitless executions [10, 17, 18, 66], or utilizing multi-
core to accelerate bug detection [37]. Our work differs from
all the above, as our focus is not to test schedules with a given
seed file, but to generate seed files that execute multithreading-
relevant paths. In particular, our goal of schedule-intervention
instrumentation is to diversify the actual schedules to help
provide feedback during fuzzing.
8 Conclusion
This paper presented MUZZ, a novel technique that empow-
ers thread-aware seed generation to GBFs for fuzzing multi-
threaded programs. Our approach performs three novel instru-
mentations that can distinguish execution states introduced by
thread-interleavings. Based on the feedback provided by these
instrumentations, MUZZ optimizes the dynamic strategies to
stress different kinds of multithreading context. Experiments
on 12 real-world programs demonstrate that MUZZ outper-
forms other grey-box fuzzers such as AFL and MOPT in gen-
erating valuable seeds, detecting concurrency-vulnerabilities,
as well as revealing concurrency-bugs.
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